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INTRODUCTION 
As the healthcare industry adjusts to the electronic era, medical 
devices increasingly boast wireless abilities for efficient data collection 
and transmission, representing a means for more efficient healthcare. 
However, medical devices, much like other computer systems, are subject 
to cybersecurity issues ranging from malware infection to data breaches 
caused by hackers.1 In October of 2016, a cyberattack on Dyn, an Internet 
                                                     
 1. See Russell L. Jones & Sheryl Coughlin, Networked Medical Device Cybersecurity and 
Patient Safety: Perspectives of Health Care Information Cybersecurity Executives, DELOITTE (2013), 
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infrastructure management company, shut down sites such as Netflix, 
CNN, the Guardian, and Twitter after malware caused Dyn’s server to 
collapse.2 Although the attack on Dyn did not involve medical devices, it 
provides a prime example of the “catastrophic risks” to which networked 
devices, including medical devices, are vulnerable.3 Thus, with wireless 
capabilities comes the threat of cyberattacks that compromise not only the 
patient information collected by these devices but also the health and 
safety of patients using the devices.4 
Recently, the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity 
released a report recommending that healthcare organizations invest in 
information technology (IT) infrastructure testing to avoid compromising 
patients’ health information and safety.5 Some institutions, including 
government agencies, have used so-called white hat hackers—individuals 
hired to hack into the institutions’ own computer systems to test 
cybersecurity—to test their security systems to discover and fix 
vulnerabilities.6 For instance, in 2013, the Mayo Clinic employed a team 
of white hat hackers to spend a full week hacking into forty different 
medical devices presented to them, and the team succeeded in 
compromising each device.7 As recently as November 2016, patients using 
wireless insulin pumps were notified of a security flaw in their devices 
                                                     
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/life-sciences-health-care/us-lhsc-
networked-medical-device.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTG3-Y9ZL]. 
 2. Mike Orcutt, Security Experts Warn Congress That the Internet of Things Could Kill People, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603015/security-experts-warn-
congress-that-the-internet-of-things-could-kill-people/ [https://perma.cc/H5BS-WCPJ]; see also 
Nicky Woolf, DDoS Attack That Disrupted Internet Was Largest of Its Kind in History, Experts Say, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-
mirai-botnet [https://perma.cc/K28M-YLEM] (stating that the cyberattack, “likely the largest of its 
kind in history,” on Dyn’s servers used special “botnet” malware to infect computers and overwhelm 
servers with traffic). 
 3. See Orcutt, supra note 2. 
 4. See Jim Finkle, U.S. Government Probes Medical Devices for Possible Cyber Flaws, REUTERS 
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-cybersecurity-medicaldevices-insight-
idUSKCN0IB0DQ20141022#vxsirEiPIC8ghM5U.97 [https://perma.cc/5XYN-PQP7] (stating that a 
cybersecurity researcher, Billy Rios, wrote a program that could remotely force multiple pumps to 
dose patients with potentially lethal amounts of drugs). 
 5. See Elizabeth Snell, How Healthcare Cybersecurity Ties into Larger National Plan, 
HEALTHIT SECURITY (Dec. 6, 2016), http://healthitsecurity.com/news/how-healthcare-cybersecurity-
ties-into-larger-national-plan [https://perma.cc/T34H-JKS8]; see also COMISSIONN ON ENHANCING 
NAT’L CYBERSECURITY, REPORT ON SECURING AND GROWING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2016). 
 6. See Jason Miller, IRS Hires ‘White-Hat’ Hackers to Help Protect IT Systems, FED. NEWS 
RADIO (Nov. 28, 2016), http://federalnewsradio.com/cybersecurity/2016/11/irs-hires-white-hat-
hackers-help-protect-systems/ [https://perma.cc/K6B9-8FDV]. 
 7. See Monte Reel & Jordan Robertson, It’s Way Too Easy to Hack the Hospital: Firewalls and 
Medical Devices Are Extremely Vulnerable, and Everyone’s Pointing Fingers, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-hospital-hack/ 
[https://perma.cc/L2SD-FNUM]. 
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which “could permit hackers to take control, alter dosage levels and 
disable the device altogether.”8 These cybersecurity flaws present a 
legitimate concern about cyberattacks on medical devices and a 
consequent need for more effective cybersecurity measures.9 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) noted that there 
are approximately 300 types of medical devices affected by the threat of 
cyberattacks, including drug infusion pumps, ventilators, and external 
defibrillators.10 This risk is compounded by the fact that electronic 
Protected Health Information (ePHI)—the information contained in 
electronic patient medical records and often gathered via medical 
devices—is increasing in value on the black market.11 Personal health 
information is now more valuable than credit card data. A 2012 report by 
the Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society stated “a 
patient health record is valued at $50, compared to $3 for a social security 
number and $1.50 for a credit card number.”12 
Reflecting the value of ePHI, the media is increasingly focusing its 
attention on the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices. Fictional 
television shows have broadcast episodes in which public figures, such as 
the Vice President of the United States, were victims of cyberattacks on 
their medical devices.13 In reality, former Vice President Dick Cheney was 
so disturbed by the potential for cyberattacks on his own cardiac 
defibrillator that he asked his doctor to disable the device’s wireless 
function.14 More recently, pharmaceutical and medical device 
                                                     
 8. Jon Markman, Connected Medical Devices Cause Cybersecurity Blues, FORBES (Nov.  
29, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmarkman/2016/11/29/connected-medical-devices-cause-
cybersecurity-blues/#624f5d831dc8. 
 9. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR 
MANAGEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 4 (2014), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/ 
deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm356190.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6AM-S9UA] 
[hereinafter HHS PREMARKET GUIDANCE]; see also Suzanne B. Schwartz, National Cyber Security 
Awareness Month: Understanding the Interdependencies of Medical Devices and Cybersecurity, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2016), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2016/10/ 
national-cyber-security-awareness-month-understanding-the-interdependencies-of-medical-devices-
and-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/VF3M-3QQ3]. 
 10. See Dina Fine Maron, A New Cyber Concern: Hack Attacks on Medical Devices, SCI.  
AM. (June 25, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-new-cyber-concern-hack/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7R3T-NZDR]. 
 11. See Dan Stoker, Medical Devices: Safe, But Are They Secure?, HIPPA CENT. (2014), 
http://docplayer.net/15746703-Medical-devices-safe-but-are-they-secure-dan-stoker-consultant-
professional-services-coalfire.html [https://perma.cc/XX3Y-ULK3]. 
 12. Id. at 2–3. 
 13. See Homeland: Broken Hearts (Showtime Networks, Inc. broadcast Dec. 2, 2012). 
 14. See Bob Fredericks, Cheney Feared Terrorists Would ‘Hack’ Pacemaker, N.Y. POST (Oct. 
19, 2013, 4:11 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/10/19/cheney-feared-heart-gizmo-hack-attack/ [https:// 
perma.cc/J574-6TC5]. 
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manufacturer Johnson & Johnson issued a warning to patients using its 
insulin pumps that hackers could exploit a security flaw in the pumps “to 
overdose diabetic patients with insulin.”15 The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) echoed the concern about cyberattacks on medical 
devices when it issued guidance regarding networked medical devices, 
stating that vulnerable off-the-shelf software “can allow an attacker to get 
unauthorized access to a network or medical device[.]”16 The media and 
the FDA’s attention reflects the reality that cybersecurity is an 
“indispensable part of medical device design and implementation.”17 
The FDA has the authority to regulate medical devices premarket as 
well as those in the market.18 Congress granted this broad regulatory 
authority to the FDA through the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
and its subsequent amendments to include medical devices.19 It is the 
FDA’s responsibility to safeguard medical devices in the United States 
before and after they enter the market.20 In response to growing concern 
over cyberattacks on medical devices, the FDA issued nonbinding 
guidelines on evaluating cybersecurity for device manufacturers.21 More 
specifically, the draft guidance recommends that medical device 
manufacturers justify the security functions they have chosen for their 
medical devices during the premarket submission process for approval by 
the FDA.22 In addition, the guidance document suggests a framework for 
manufacturers to implement cybersecurity functions and maintain the 
integrity of their medical devices.23 The guidance suggested cybersecurity 
strategies that include limiting access to networked devices based on the 
type of device, its use and potential vulnerabilities, and the risk of harm in 
the event of a cybersecurity breach.24 Further, the FDA noted that “it is 
                                                     
 15. Yes, Pacemakers Can Get Hacked, N.Y. POST (Dec. 29, 2016), http://nypost.com/2016/ 
12/29/yes-pacemakers-can-get-hacked/ [https://perma.cc/Q5A4-G3CR]. 
 16. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CYBERSECURITY FOR NETWORKED 
MEDICAL DEVICES CONTAINING OFF-THE-SHELF (OTS) SOFTWARE, https://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm077823.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GJB-WFK8] [hereinafter FDA GUIDANCE ON OTS SOFTWARE DEVICES]. 
 17. See Stoker, supra note 11, at 3. 
 18. What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,  http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
Transparency/Basics/ucm194879.htm [https://perma.cc/KC95-C3SY]; see also Does FDA Regulate 
Medical Devices?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ 
ucm194413.htm [https://perma.cc/WH8H-C4X6]. 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938). For pending legislation that addresses direct-to-consumer drug 
advertising, and investigational drugs and devices for terminally ill, respectively, see H.R. 4565, 114th 
Cong. (2015); H.R. 790, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 20. See Ann Mileur Boeckman, An Exercise in Administrative Creativity: The FDA’s Assertion 
of Jurisdiction over Tobacco, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 991–92 (1996). 
 21. See HHS PREMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 4. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 3–4. 
 24. Id. at 4–5. 
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rare for healthcare organizations to have enough technical resources and 
information on the design of medical devices to independently maintain 
medical device software. Thus, most healthcare organizations need to rely 
on the advice of medical device manufacturers.”25 As a result, there is a 
certain amount of reliance by healthcare providers on the information and 
guidelines medical device manufacturers provide about their networked 
devices. 
As of December 2016, the FDA issued an additional nonbinding 
guidance document, this time addressing the post-market management of 
networked medical devices.26 Particularly, the new guidance emphasizes 
that manufacturers should monitor the cybersecurity vulnerabilities of 
their devices after they enter the market.27 In addition, the FDA sets up “a 
risk-based framework for assessing when changes to medical devices for 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities require reporting to the Agency” and when 
reporting is not required.28 Medical device manufacturers are encouraged 
to gather cybersecurity information by means such as “independent 
security researchers, in-house testing, suppliers of software or hardware 
technology, health care facilities, and information sharing and analysis 
organizations.”29 This monitoring is in line with a Presidential Executive 
Order issued in 2013, which recognized information sharing as an essential 
component needed to “better protect and defend” against cyberattacks.30 
Finally, the post-market guidance provides that risk-assessment should 
focus on the risk of harm to a patient—ranging from temporary discomfort 
to death—if a networked device is vulnerable to attack.31 Where a medical 
device’s vulnerability to cyberattacks poses a risk of “serious adverse 
events or death” to patients, the patient harm is deemed “uncontrolled” 
under the FDA’s proposed risk assessment, and manufacturers are urged 
to notify customers and the community, implement temporary controls, 
develop a plan to remedy the device’s vulnerability, and for some devices, 
                                                     
 25. Information for Healthcare Organizations about FDA’s “Guidance for Industry: 
Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices Containing Off-The-Shelf (OTS) Software”, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. (2015), http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm070634.htm 
[https://perma.cc/XQ6H-A79J] (responding to when healthcare organizations may apply software 
patches to medical devices that do not come from the medical device manufacturer). 
 26. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POSTMARKET MANAGEMENT OF 
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFf (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregula-
tionandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm482022.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PUL-VL3P] [hereinafter 
HHS POSTMARKET GUIDANCE]. 
 27. See id. at 4. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 14. 
 30. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013). 
 31. See HHS POSTMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 15–17. 
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submit a remediation report to the FDA.32 Both FDA guidance documents 
stress the importance of cybersecurity in developing and marketing 
medical devices, but both are nevertheless nonbinding. 
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) with the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS) announced in the 2016 Work Plan 
that they intends to focus more intensively on the security of medical 
devices with wireless network capabilities.33 Specifically, the OIG 
announced that it would “examine whether [the] FDA’s oversight of 
hospitals’ networked medical devices is sufficient to effectively protect 
associated electronic protected health information (ePHI).”34 The OIG 
noted that medical devices integrated with electronic medical records 
(EMRs) were included in the threat to personal health information privacy 
and security.35 Finally, the OIG remarked that device manufacturers must 
provide Manufacturer Disclosure Statements for Medical Device Security 
(MDS2) that assess the “vulnerability and risks associated with ePHI that 
is transmitted or maintained” by a particular medical device to health care 
providers purchasing the devices.36 In contrast to the OIG’s 2016 Work 
Plan, the Plan for 2017 appears to focus on the FDA’s activity in 
addressing cybersecurity issues after devices have entered the market in 
addition to the FDA’s regular premarket approval processes.37 The 2017 
Work Plan announces that OIG “will examine the FDA’s plans and 
processes for timely communicating and addressing a networked medical 
device cybersecurity compromise” and specifically points out concern for 
patient safety.38 
It is clear that government entities, such as the FDA, OIG, and 
DHHS, acknowledge the urgent need to mitigate the threat of cyberattacks 
                                                     
 32. See id. at 17 (stating that if a manufacturer participates in information sharing, the FDA will 
not enforce compliance with reporting requirements under 21 C.F.R. § 806, but that class III device 
remediation must be reported annually). Class III medical devices are the most stringently regulated 
types of medical devices, such as heart valves, because they pose the highest risk to the patient. See 
Overview of Medical Device Classification and Reclassification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/cdrh/cdrhtransparen
cy/ucm378714.htm [https://perma.cc/KFB2-6W4P]. 
 33. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORK PLAN: 
FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 53, http://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/workplan/2016/oig-
work-plan-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NMY8-H57U] [hereinafter 2016 OIG WORK PLAN]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, What’s on HHS OIG’s Plan for Scrutinizing Security in 2017?, 
GOV INFO SECURITY (Dec. 2, 2016), http://www.govinfosecurity.com/whats-on-hhs-oigs-plan-for-
scrutinizing-security-in-2017-a-9571 [https://perma.cc/T7E5-3V78]; see also OFF. OF INSPECTOR 
GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2017 (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/archives/workplan/2017/HHS%20OIG%20Work% 
20Plan%202017.pdf  [https://perma.cc/NMY8-H57U] [hereinafter 2017 OIG WORK PLAN]. 
 38. 2017 OIG WORK PLAN, supra note 37, at 62. 
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on hospital networks and medical devices.39 However, current avenues for 
preventing cybersecurity breaches and remedies available to victims of 
cyberattacks, as well as federal healthcare regulatory laws, do not fully 
address the problems surrounding networked medical devices. Because 
cybersecurity risk assessment is not required by law, patients who may be 
harmed by cyberattacks on medical devices may be barred from seeking 
redress from device manufacturers whose devices have been  
market-approved by the FDA.40 Rather than the provision of nonbinding 
guidelines, the best means of addressing this issue is through changes in 
legislation and stringent regulation by the FDA. 
This article discusses: (I) the current legal approaches to addressing 
cybersecurity in general, (II) the shortcomings of current legal approaches, 
(III) a proposal for legislation to narrow the scope of the Medical Device 
Amendments (MDA) preemption clause, and (IV) the benefits and 
shortcomings of the proposed legislation. 
I. CURRENT LEGAL APPROACHES TO PROSECUTING CYBERATTACKS 
Currently, prosecutors may use several avenues to address 
cyberattacks on medical devices: (A) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA), (B) the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, (C) tort law, and (D) the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
A. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Under the CFAA, individuals who access a computer without 
authorization to either obtain information or transmit harmful information 
are subject to a fine, imprisonment for up to ten years, or both.41 To recover 
under Section 1030(a)(2)(C), a plaintiff would have to show that an 
accused (1) intentionally accessed a computer, (2) without authorization 
or exceeding authorized access, and (3) obtained information from any 
protected computer.42 Alternatively, a plaintiff harmed by malicious 
software on a medical device may recover under Section 1030(a)(5) if they 
are able to show that the accused accessed a protected computer without 
authorization either knowingly or intentionally, and both (1) caused the 
transmission of a program, code, or command, and (2) as a result of such 
                                                     
 39. See, e.g., HHS PREMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 1; see also 2017 OIG WORK PLAN, 
supra note 37, at 51, 61–62. 
 40. See Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 41. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2011). Pending legislation to clarify the meaning of “access without 
authorization” and other purposes has been proposed but is projected not to pass. See Aaron’s Law 
Act of 2015, S. 1030, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 42. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2011). 
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conduct, caused damage.43 Thus, the CFAA punishes intentional acts 
causing harm, but it is important to note that the CFAA does not impose 
any liability on the manufacturers of medical devices.44 
B. The Federal Anti-Tampering Act 
Similar to the CFAA, the Federal Anti-Tampering Act also imposes 
criminal liability on intentional actors who tamper with consumer 
products.45 To prevail under Section 1365(a) of the Act, a plaintiff must 
show that the accused acted (1) with reckless disregard for the risk that 
another person will be placed in danger of death or bodily injury and (2) 
with extreme indifference to such risk.46 The Federal Anti-Tampering Act 
punishes malicious actors in accordance with the damage caused, with 
potential imprisonment ranging from ten years to life.47 Much like the 
CFAA, the Federal Anti-Tampering Act punishes intentional or reckless 
actors whose actions cause harm but does not impose liability on medical 
device manufacturers unless the damage results from the manufacturers’ 
actions.48 However, unlike the CFAA, Section 1365(g) of the Federal 
Anti-Tampering Act gives the FDA and the Department of Agriculture 
authority to investigate violations involving a consumer product regulated 
by their respective agencies.49 
C. Tort Law 
Tort law imposes liability on the malicious actors behind 
cyberattacks and may also impose liability on negligent medical device 
manufacturers. Actors causing harm by way of a cyberattack on a patient’s 
medical device may be sued under the tort of battery.50 To prevail under a 
theory of battery, the plaintiff would have to show (1) that the accused 
acted intending to cause harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff, or 
an imminent apprehension of such contact, and (2) that such contact 
                                                     
 43. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5); see also Michael S. Urcuyo, From Internet Trolls to Seasoned 
Hackers: Protecting our Financial Interests from Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks, 42 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 299, 304 (2016). 
 44. Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and Hospital Networks: 
Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 152 (2014). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
 46. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (stating “Whoever, with intent to cause serious injury to the business 
of any person, taints any consumer product or renders materially false or misleading the labeling of, 
or container for, a consumer product, if such consumer product affects interstate or foreign commerce, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both”). 
 49. 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a). 
 50. Wellington, supra note 44, at 175–77. 
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directly or indirectly resulted.51 Under the Restatement of Torts, “contact 
with another’s person” includes contact with anything held or attached to 
the person harmed.52 This inclusion stems from battery theory, where “the 
plaintiff’s grievance consists in the offense to the dignity involved in the 
unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability of his person.”53 
Medical device manufacturers are governed by federal regulations, 
such as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA). 
Medical devices that “support or sustain human life” or “present a 
potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury” are subject to a “complete 
and thorough review process with the FDA,” known as premarket approval 
(PMA) before they may be marketed.54 This process requires a medical 
device manufacturer to provide to the FDA “reasonable assurance that its 
device is both safe and effective.”55 Thus, an injured patient may have a 
cause of action against medical device manufacturers that “fail to adopt 
reasonable cybersecurity measures” for their medical devices.56 The FDA 
has recently issued draft guidance for manufacturers of devices that 
“contain software (including firmware) or programmable logic as well as 
software that is a medical device.”57 This guidance recommends that 
“manufacturers should address cybersecurity during the design and 
development of the medical device.”58 However, the draft guidance is 
nonbinding.59 Consequently, the draft guidance does not appear to provide 
a strong incentive for manufacturers to meet their duty of care in ensuring 
the cybersecurity of their devices, and those devices approved for market 
by the FDA are shielded from manufacturer liability claims.60 As such, tort 
law provides avenues for injured patients to seek redress but poses 
difficulties in assigning liability and ability to sue. 
D. The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act 
Not all medical device companies are required to comply with the 
Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), although 
those companies that do comply are often “business associates” of 
                                                     
 51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. In re Medtronic Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1150 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 55. 21 U.S.C. § 360d (2011). 
 56. See Wellington, supra note 44, at 178. 
 57. See HHS PREMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 2. 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 1. 
 60. See Wellington, supra note 44, at 178; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 522 U.S. 312 
(2008) (holding that plaintiffs cannot sue device manufacturers in tort under most circumstances once 
the FDA clears a device through the PMA process). 
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healthcare providers.61 HIPAA provides some protection against 
cyberattacks by creating a regulatory framework to safeguard protected 
health information (PHI).62 The Act specifically regulates both the privacy 
and security of PHI, as well as healthcare providers that electronically bill 
for services (hereinafter referred to as “covered entities”).63 Generally, 
medical device companies are not covered by HIPAA unless they sell 
equipment to patients and bill Medicare.64 Two regulations within HIPAA 
apply to protection of PHI: the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule.65 
The Privacy Rule applies to information that could reasonably be 
used to identify an individual, including name; address; and past, present, 
or future health conditions.66 The rule further permits de-identification of 
health information, entailing the removal of “specified identifiers of the 
individual” or “a formal determination by a qualified statistician.”67 The 
latter involves “a person with appropriate knowledge of and experience 
with” statistics to use scientific and statistical methods to determine that 
there is a very small risk that the information, combined with publicly 
available information, could be used to identify a patient.68 To be properly 
anonymized under the Privacy Rule, ePHI must meet an “actual 
knowledge” standard, in that the de-identification “is adequate only if the 
covered entity has no actual knowledge that the remaining information 
could be used to identify the individual.”69 One goal of the Privacy Rule 
and its requirements is to limit use and disclosure of protected health 
information, the latter being subject to exceptions as permitted by the 
Privacy Rule or as authorized by the individual with whom the information 
is concerned.70 Further, an entity’s maintenance, use, or disclosure of PHI 
                                                     
 61. See When may a Covered Health Care Provider Disclose Protected Health Information, with 
an Authorization or Business Associate Agreement, to a Medical Device Company Representative?, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/490/when-
may-a-covered-health-care-provider-disclose-protected-health-information-without-
authorization/index.html [https://perma.cc/RLH9-VQGW]. 
 62. 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2010). 
 63. Privacy Basics: A Quick HIPAA Check for Medical Device Companies, MED. DEVICE & 
DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.mddionline.com/article/privacy-basics-quick-
hipaa-check-medical-device-companies [https://perma.cc/PL9W-YA5J] [hereinafter Privacy Basics]. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 3 (2003), 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html?language=es 
[https://perma.cc/489Z-5PVU] [hereinafter HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY]. 
 67. Id. at 4 (noting that there are no restrictions on the use or disclosure of de-identified health 
information, because it does not provide a reasonable basis to identify an individual). 
 68. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2011). 
 69. See HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 66, at 4. 
 70. Id. at 4. 
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is subject to compliance investigations by the DHHS, for which such 
information may be accessed.71 
The Security Rule applies to health care providers who transmit 
health information in electronic form.72 Further, the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act expanded 
the application of the Security Rule to covered entities’ business 
associates, which are entities or persons that are involved in the “use or 
disclosure of protected health information” on behalf of a covered entity.73 
Business associates include entities providing legal, accounting, 
consulting, administrative, and data aggregation services, among others.74 
The main purpose of the Security Rule is to provide enough flexibility to 
allow the integration of technological advancements into the operation of 
healthcare, specifically the electronic transmission of protected health 
information, while mitigating the risks to consumers.75 
Most medical device distributors are not considered “business 
associates” under HIPAA but could be classified as such if their 
involvement in health information gathering, billing, or furnishing of 
“health care” satisfied HIPAA’s definition of “health care providers.”76 
Medical device manufacturers that sell their products to other entities for 
medical use would be required to enter into a business associate agreement 
in order to access PHI for cost-savings estimates on the use of their 
devices.77 As a result, the expansion of the HIPAA Privacy and Security 
Rules has resulted in some, but not all, medical device manufacturers 
being subject to HIPAA compliance. 
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT LEGAL APPROACHES 
Part I described the current legal approaches to prosecuting 
cyberattacks. These approaches do not sufficiently address the threat of 
cyberattacks partly because they focus on deterrence or require an 
identifiable malicious actor. In cyberspace, effective deterrence is difficult 
                                                     
 71. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESTRICTIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACCESS  
TO HEALTH INFORMATION, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/ 
govtaccess.html [https://perma.cc/67WV-VXTP]. 
 72. See HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 66. 
 73. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY: UNDERSTANDING 
HIPAA PRIVACY: BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (2003), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/ 
privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html [https://perma.cc/GUW7-XCHZ]. 
 74. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2015). 
 75. See HIPAA PRIVACY RULE SUMMARY, supra note 66. 
 76. Barbara Kramer & Mitchell A. Kramer, The New HIPAA Rules and What They Mean for 
Medical Device Distributors, KRAMER & KRAMER, LLP, http://www.kramerandkramer.com/wp-
content/themes/kramerkramer/img/HIPAA_REVISED_RULES_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JES-
U2F2]. 
 77. Id. 
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to implement, and an identifiable actor may be difficult to pinpoint.78 
Without the ability to attribute cyberattacks to the actors who perpetrate 
them or incentivize these actors to cease their attacks, the current legal 
framework for prosecuting such attacks remains insufficient.79 
The CFAA may not serve as a sufficient deterrent against these 
attacks because it requires the ability to identify the malicious actors 
responsible.80 Further, case law provides that even if an actor is identified, 
the evidentiary standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt” must be met to 
convict for any alleged cyberattack.81 Tracing a cyberattack back to an 
actor depends as much on the type of code in the malware used as it does 
on the investigative resources available and can often leave investigators 
chasing their own tails.82 For example, the documents leaked by Edward 
Snowden in 2013 provided data on the malware used by government 
agencies to spy on their targets, yet the accused agencies denied ownership 
of the identified malware.83 Most cyberattack cases are not accompanied 
by an information leak to help narrow down malware and individual 
culprits, and plaintiffs seeking to recover damages do not have the same 
resources as a government in tracing an actor through cyberspace.84 
Although pinpointing the actor behind a cyberattack may be possible in 
cases where the actor uses a company laptop and login credentials,85 it is 
admittedly more burdensome when the actor is less readily identifiable.86 
While the Federal Anti-Tampering Act imposes harsher penalties 
than the CFAA, it does not impose penalties on medical device 
manufacturers or hospitals that negligently fail to secure their devices or 
networks.87 In order to allege a prima facie products liability claim under 
                                                     
 78. See Wellington, supra note 44, at 184. 
 79. See Shane McGee, Randy V. Sabett & Anand Shah, Adequate Attribution: A Framework for 
Developing a National Policy for Private Sector Use of Active Defense, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 28–29 
(2013) [hereinafter Adequate Attribution] (stating: “Our legal and policy frameworks for responding 
to cyberattacks cannot work unless we have adequate attribution; these frameworks remain incomplete 
because we lack the basis (sufficient attribution) to actually use them”). 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2011). 
 81. See United States v. Shahulhameed, 629 F. App’x 685, 687 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that, in 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the conviction if “after viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979))). 
 82. Larry Greenemeier, CSI: Cyber-Attack Scene Investigation—A Malware Whodunit, SCI. AM. 
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/csi-cyber-attack-scene-investigation-a-
malware-whodunit/ [https://perma.cc/NP5E-9TRP]. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Shahulhameed, 629 F. App’x at 687. 
 86. See Wellington, supra note 44, at 184 (stating that “[a]s long as it remains difficult to identify 
and prosecute the actors behind cyberattacks, criminal law is an insufficient deterrent”). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2011); 18 U.S.C. § 1365 (2012). 
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the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
product was in a defective condition that made it unreasonably dangerous, 
that the defective condition existed when the product left the defendant’s 
control, and that the defective condition proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
injuries.”88 This burden of proof may prove difficult for a plaintiff to 
overcome. 
Tort law imposes similar burdens of proof on plaintiffs regarding the 
identity of malicious actors. Under the Restatement of Torts, a plaintiff 
must identify a malicious actor as the cause of harm.89 As discussed 
previously, attribution of a cyberattack imposes a high investigative 
burden that may prove to be impossible,90 and without the ability to 
attribute cyberattacks to the actors who perpetrate them, the current legal 
framework for prosecuting such attacks remains insufficient.91 
HIPAA fails to create a direct incentive for medical device 
manufacturers to adopt improved security measures because it does not 
apply to medical device companies unless they directly deal with PHI.92 
HIPAA focuses on the security of ePHI and does not address some of the 
central issues posed by the threat of cyberattacks on medical devices, such 
as hackers causing serious injury or death by remotely commandeering 
implanted medical devices (such as pacemakers and drug pumps) of 
patients.93 Additionally, HIPAA does not create a right to private action 
(such as tort claims) by itself, although its regulations do not preempt 
causes of action that arise from a breach of HIPAA regulations.94 As a 
result, HIPAA requires hospitals to implement and maintain secure 
networks in order to protect patient information but fails to provide 
incentive for medical device manufacturers to implement security features 
in their devices.95 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the FDA’s broad jurisdiction 
over the regulation of medical devices, combined with the preemption 
clause contained in the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, constitute a roadblock to common law claims 
                                                     
 88. Ramirez v. Medtronic Inc., 961 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
 89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 90. See Lieutenant Commander Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to 
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who Neglect Their Duty 
to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009); Greenemeier, supra note 82. 
 91. See Adequate Attribution, supra note 79, at 28–29. 
 92. See HIPAA BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, supra note 73. 
 93. Mayura Noordyke, Medical Device Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention, 
BRANDS PROTECTION BLOG (Nov. 18, 2015), http://www.thebrandprotectionblog.com/medical-
device-exemptions-to-the-prohibition-on-circumvention/ [https://perma.cc/V6BX-VE9L]. 
 94. Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 46–47 (Conn. 2014). 
 95. See Wellington, supra note 44, at 158. 
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asserting that a medical device was defective.96 As previously discussed, 
compliance with the FDA’s draft guidance on cybersecurity is not 
mandatory for medical device manufacturers.97 In light of its “exclusive 
jurisdiction on the regulation of medical devices,” the FDA’s reluctance 
to enforce compliance with its issued guidance is problematic for the 
security of patient information and patient safety98 because the guidance 
does not establish any rights for patients or create liability for 
manufacturers or the FDA.99 Further, the FDA relies on a system of 
adverse event reporting to monitor medical devices that are already on the 
market.100 This reporting system lacks a prospective approach necessary 
to prevent patient data and safety from being harmed101 because it only 
identifies flaws once harm has occurred, and threat reports come too 
late.102 Because the manufacturers of medical devices are in the best 
position to identify and find solutions to threats, the FDA should leverage 
its ability to increase oversight under its regulatory authority in order to 
ensure that manufacturers comply with safety and security standards and 
address threats prospectively rather than reporting adverse events after the 
fact. 
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
Although government entities and media commentators increasingly 
acknowledge the threat of cyberattacks, and the former have suggested 
some guidelines, a federal regulatory approach is the best solution for 
addressing the issue of cyberattacks on medical devices.103 As discussed 
above, the FDA’s regulatory authority over medical devices, combined 
with the preemption clause of the MDA, constitutes a significant 
                                                     
 96. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2015). Pending legislation, Ariel Grace’s Law, which amends 21 U.S.C. 
360k, states, “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to modify or otherwise affect any action for 
damages or the liability of any person under the law of any State.” See H.R. 5403, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 97. See HHS PREMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 9, at 3. 
 98. David Holtzman, FDA Approach to Medical Device Security Is a Step Backward, 
HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/fda-approach-
medical-device-security-step-backward [https://perma.cc/FS8J-BDG3]. 
 99. See HHS POSTMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 26, at 4. 
 100. Mandatory Reporting Requirements: Manufacturers, Importers and Device User Facilities, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/ 
PostmarketRequirements/ReportingAdverseEvents/ucm2005737.htm [https://perma.cc/V6N6-
4BWX]. 
 101. Dov Greenbaum, Direct Digital Engagement of Patients and Democratizing Health Care, 
32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 93, 116 (2015). 
 102. See Mandatory Reporting Requirements, supra note 100 (stating that “manufacturers are 
required to report to the FDA when they learn that any of their devices may have caused or contributed 
to a death or serious injury”). 
 103. See HHS PREMARKET GUIDANCE, supra note 9; 2016 OIG WORK PLAN, supra note 33, at 
53; Maron, supra note 10. 
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roadblock to plaintiffs harmed by medical devices seeking private 
action.104 Congress should amend the MDA to (1) exempt private action 
asserting medical device defect caused by intentional cyberattacks and (2) 
exempt networked medical devices that are not sufficiently regulated by 
the FDA’s premarket approval process. 
A. Exemption for Private Action Asserting Defect  
Caused by Cyberattacks 
Despite the lack of enforcement of the FDA’s guidelines for medical 
device manufacturers, patients harmed after using medical devices 
approved for market may find their common law claims preempted under 
the MDA.105 Common law claims under the MDA are preempted because 
market-approved devices have already passed the FDA’s rigorous 
approval process, and the statute bars claims attempting to impose 
additional requirements on manufacturers.106 However, the MDA also 
supplies exceptions to its bar on common law claims, such as claims 
alleging manufacturer defect.107 These exceptions provide an avenue for 
patients harmed by defective devices to seek redress. Narrowing the scope 
of the MDA preemption clause and allowing for exceptions, such as 
manufacturer defect to take into account flaws such as network 
vulnerabilities would provide plaintiffs greater protections and incentivize 
manufacturers to adhere closely to FDA guidelines.108 
The federal government’s requirements for the FDA’s premarket 
approval process for medical devices are consistent with the fact that 
common law claims are preempted by the MDA: 
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or 
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use 
any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which 
relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other 
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this 
chapter.109 
                                                     
 104. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2015). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2015). 
 108. See Riegel v. Medtronic Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 328–31 (2008); see also FDA GUIDANCE ON 
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The rationale is that if the FDA authorizes the commercial distribution of 
a medical device that has passed its premarket approval process, then 
common law actions alleging defect of the medical device should be 
barred.110 Congress implemented this preemption clause under the policy 
that it “justifies the effective promotion and marketing of medical devices 
despite the potential cost to a few individuals who may lack redress for the 
occasional failure of [a] device.”111 For example, in Riegel v. Medtronic, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the MDA preempted the petitioner’s 
state tort law claims.112 In that case, the Court defined a two-pronged test 
for determining preemption of a common law claim.113 According to this 
test, courts must determine whether the FDA’s premarket approval process 
imposes device specific requirements on manufacturers, and if so, whether 
the asserted common law claims impose different or additional 
requirements to those set out by the FDA.114 In Marmol v. St. Jude Medical 
Center, the court held that Florida’s state law did not recognize the 
plaintiff’s strict liability and negligence claims against a medical 
manufacturer based on violations of FDA regulations.115 The federal 
claims were impliedly preempted because the state law did not recognize 
private actions to enforce FDA regulations and because state law lacked a 
parallel duty to file adverse reports with the FDA.116 Thus, the general 
scheme of preemption revolves around whether or not a plaintiff’s claim 
is attempting to impose additional legal requirements on a medical device 
manufacturer.117 
However, certain exemptions apply to the statute. The statute 
describes two circumstances, one of which is relevant here, in which an 
exemption to the preemption clause may apply: 
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the 
Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and 
opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this 
section, under such conditions as may be prescribed in such 
regulation, a requirement of such State or political subdivision 
applicable to a device intended for human use if (1) the requirement 
is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter which would 
be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect under 
this subsection or; (2) the requirement (A) is required by compelling 
                                                     
 110. Marmol v. St. Jude Med. Ctr., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1363–64 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 
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local conditions, and (B) compliance with the requirement would not 
cause the device to be in violation of any applicable requirement 
under this chapter.118 
Some of these exemptions include claims alleging manufacturing defect, 
failure to warn, breach of express warranty, strict liability, negligence,119 
and “unreasonable danger per se.”120 For example, personal injury, product 
liability, and other state law claims against medical device manufacturers 
are not preempted, particularly where the requirements of these state law 
claims were either parallel to or not covered by the MDA.121 As such, 
common law claims are preempted only where they might interfere with 
the specific federal requirements set out in the FDA’s product approval 
process.122 
In its nonbinding guidelines, the FDA does not enforce the 
requirement that medical device manufacturers assess cybersecurity risks 
to their devices. Refusal by the FDA to enforce its guidelines through the 
MDA premarket approval process—which would require manufacturers 
to implement the proposed cybersecurity measures if they want their 
medical devices to be marketed—combined with the MDA preemption 
clause could leave patients harmed by cyberattacks to their networked 
devices preempted in their claims. Specifically, because cybersecurity risk 
assessment is not a statutory requirement within the MDA, a court may 
hold that patients’ claims that attempt to impose liability on a device 
manufacturer after a cyberattack are barred because the claims would 
impose legal requirements in addition to or different from current FDA 
approval standards.123 The FDA’s guidance document provides examples 
of “intentional” threats to networked medical devices.124 These examples 
include hackers, disgruntled employees, and organized crime hackers who 
will use malware, viruses, or their administrative access to attempt to 
infiltrate ePHI or attack the personal medical devices of high-profile 
patients.125 Consideration of this language when implementing an 
amendment to the MDA preemption clause may provide plaintiffs an 
avenue to assert common law claims that arise from cyberattacks on 
medical devices. By permitting claims that allege a defect in device 
                                                     
 118. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (2015). 
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software or network security, courts could open the door to investigation 
into the cause of such cyberattacks, incentivizing both sides—patients and 
manufacturers—to pinpoint cybersecurity vulnerabilities that may then be 
addressed. 
Reducing the breadth of the MDA preemption clause is also 
expressly supported in Riegel, where the Court states: 
[Although] “§360k does not prevent a State from providing a 
damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA 
regulations[,]” [t]hat remedy . . . does not help consumers injured by 
devices that receive FDA approval but nevertheless prove unsafe. 
The MDA’s failure to create any federal compensatory remedy for 
such consumers further suggests that Congress did not intend broadly 
to preempt state common-law suits grounded on allegations 
independent of FDA requirements. It is “difficult to believe that 
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial 
recourse” for large number of consumers injured by defective 
medical devices.126 
Such a narrowing of the MDA preemption clause would incentivize 
medical device manufacturers to adhere to the FDA’s guidelines more 
stringently until an appropriate regulatory scheme for networked medical 
devices is implemented. Providing an exemption to the MDA’s 
preemption clause for private action resulting from an intentional 
cyberattack on medical devices presents one legal remedy for harm caused 
by cyberattacks on medical devices. 
B. Exemption for Insufficient Regulation by the FDA’s  
Premarket Approval Process 
Taking into account the difficulty in identifying who is responsible 
for cyberattacks on medical devices, it is important that strict regulation of 
networked medical devices be enforced either by FDA premarket approval 
and post-market monitoring requirements or by providing an exemption to 
the MDA’s preemption when device regulation is insufficient. The 
emphasis should be on incentivizing the incorporation of stringent 
enforcement of cybersecurity standards in the regulation of medical device 
manufacture and sale, not merely shifting liability for cyberattacks from 
hackers to medical device manufacturers or hospitals.127 HIPAA’s 
Security Rule provides useful language for implementing exemptions for 
preempted plaintiffs harmed by cyberattacks on medical devices where 
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network security was compromised.128 The security standards provided 
under Section 164.306 state that 
[c]overed entities . . . must . . . (1) ensure the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of all electronic protected health 
information the covered entity or business associate creates, receives, 
maintains, or transmits[,] (2) protect against any reasonably 
anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such 
information[,] [and] (3) [p]rotect against any reasonably anticipated 
uses or disclosures of such information that are not permitted or 
required . . . .129 
While liability in such cases may shift to hospitals maintaining the 
medical devices’ networks, providing legal avenues for plaintiffs may help 
create a culture of cybersecurity compliance—an industry-wide effort to 
follow network safety guidelines and address vulnerabilities.130 Further, 
language requiring device manufacturers and hospitals to take “reasonable 
steps” to protect medical devices from security breaches would avoid strict 
liability, thereby barring imposition of damages on entities that followed 
prescribed standards.131 Medical device manufacturers seeking to gain the 
trust of clients, such as hospitals, in order to sell medical devices, may 
enter into business associate agreements requiring the manufacturers to 
continuously monitor their devices in accordance with the FDA’s 
guidelines. As a result, healthcare providers and device manufacturers 
collaborate to prevent rather than remedy vulnerabilities in their 
networked devices. 
IV. CRITIQUE AND BENEFITS OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
Current legal approaches to prosecuting cyberattacks, such as the 
CFAA,132 Federal Anti-Tampering Act,133 or tort law, impose significant 
burdens of proof on plaintiffs when it comes to attributing responsibility 
for their harm, which limit their efficacy. Although HIPAA addresses the 
need for securing ePHI,134 it does not apply to medical device 
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manufacturers or all medical devices without an explicit agreement.135 The 
FDA’s current nonbinding guidelines for medical device manufacturers 
provide a strong regulatory framework but are expressly not enforced.136 
The FDA refraining from exercising its regulatory authority over medical 
devices could result in preemption of common law claims brought by 
persons injured by an attack that compromised the function of their 
medical device because of the precedent set by Riegel.137 
Allowing injured plaintiffs to seek reasonable legal remedy via the 
MDA preemption exemption is the best way to address existing gaps 
within our legal framework until better avenues of tracing malicious actors 
and securing such devices are available. Technologies currently in 
development may render devices ranging from pacemakers to cars 
unhackable.138 However, implementation of such technologies may  
be years away,139 and our legal system must move with  
technology—especially in the field of healthcare and networked medical 
devices.140   
It is undeniable that allowing damages claims by patients harmed as 
a result of cyberattacks on their medical devices would lead to an increase 
in litigation and a strain on judicial resources. For this reason, in addition 
to those discussed previously, an enforceable regulatory framework for 
networked medical devices would promote the proactive safety culture141 
sought by the FDA’s guidance documents.142 Therefore, while narrowing 
the MDA’s preemption clause to provide legal means of addressing patient 
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harms caused by cyberattacks is one solution to the problem of 
cyberattacks on medical devices, its retroactive nature presents the same 
flaw as the FDA’s adverse event reporting scheme in that it will not deter 
cyberattacks, only seek to punish those after they have committed the 
offense. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though cyberattacks on medical devices may currently seem 
like a fictive scheme meant to frighten the general public, the reality is that 
hackers were able to commandeer medical devices years ago,143 and more 
cyberattacks could occur before any legal remedies have been established. 
As such, the need for more stringent FDA regulation and legal avenues for 
prosecuting cyberattacks is undeniably urgent.  
Since the FDA regulates devices currently in the market mainly 
through adverse event reporting, networked devices that were subject to 
cyberattacks should be included in an exemption to the MDA preemption 
clause where unsecure networked medical devices are involved. Until 
better technological and legal avenues exist for attributing cyberattacks on 
medical devices to the actual attackers, our legal system must provide 
adequate remedies to persons who sustain loss of health or life as a result 
of such attacks, even if that means holding device manufacturers 
accountable to a high standard of care in maintaining cybersecurity. In 
addition, the potential liability of manufacturers and hospitals could 
promote information sharing within the healthcare and tech communities 
where network vulnerabilities and mitigation tactics are of concern. The 
FDA’s guidelines point to the importance of employing cybersecurity 
experts to test network vulnerabilities and sharing the information 
gathered so that the safety of medical devices, and ultimately patients, may 
be efficiently promoted.144 Therefore, a regulatory incentive for 
manufacturers and technology companies to collaborate in matters of 
cybersecurity could move the future of healthcare in a positive direction. 
Cyberattacks in the healthcare field are no longer a fictive futuristic 
threat; they are a reality that can no longer be left to the technology 
industry. The time has come for our government and regulatory agencies 
to address this issue through legislation and enforcement. 
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